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AUTOMOBILES-GRATUITOUS BAILEE-IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE-The defen-
dant was operating his automobile at an unlawful rate of speed and
attempted to make a left turn in violation of the traffic code, thereby collid-
ing with plaintiff's automobile which was being operated by plaintiff's wife.
Plaintiff brings this action to recover for the damages to his automobile.
The defendant sets up the contributory negligence of the plaintiff's wife
by way of defense. Held: Such contributory negligence will not be im-
puted to the plaintiff so as to bar his recovery. Lee v. Layton, Appellate
Court of Indiana, August 1, 1924, 167 N. E. 540.
The weight of authority and modern tendency is that the contributory
negligence of a bailee is not imputable to the bailor, where the subject of
the bailment is damaged by a third person. Lloyd v. Northern Pacific R.
Co., 107 Wash. 57; Sea Ins. Co. v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. Co., 159 Fed. 676;
New York, L. I. & W. R. Co. v. New Jersey Electric R. Co., 60 N. J. L. 338.
The early cases, however, held that the bailee's negligence was imputable
to the bailor; and that the bailor could only recover, where on the same
facts the bailee might recover. Illinois Central R. Co. v. Sims, 77 Miss.
325; Texas and P. R. Co. v. Tankersly, 63 Tex. 57. Weltz V. Indianapolis
and V. R. Co., 105 Ind. 55, is often cited in support of this minority view,
17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 926; 6 A. L. R. 316; 45 C. J. 1027; but the Appellate
Court, in their opinion in the principal case, attempt to distinguish it from
the principal case.
The marriage station in itself raises no presumption of agency, Deben-
ham v. Mellon, L. R. 6 A. C. 24; and in the absence of such a relation in
fact, the doctrine of imputable negligence is inapplicable; that is, negli-
gence will not be imputed by reason of the marriage relation. The Louis-
ville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Creek, 130 Ind. 139.
Under the facts of the present case the husband would clearly be liable
for damages caused by the wife in a jurisdiction which adopts the family
automobile doctrine. Plasch v. Fass, 144 Minn. 48; Birch v. Abererombie,
74 Wash. 486. Therefore it would seem that the majority rule as to imput-
able negligence should be inapplicable in a jurisdiction which recognizes the
family automobile doctrine, because to hold the husband liable for damages
caused by the bailee and not make him subject to the defense of the bailee's
conduct, would be inconsistent. However, Indiana has repudiated the fam-
ily automobile doctrine. Smith v. Weaver, 73 Ind. App. 350; McGran v.
Cromwell, 86 Ind. App. 107. Therefore the present decision appears to be
both correct and consistent. J. A. B.
CONDITIONAL SALES CONTRACT-VENDOR'S ELECTION or REMEDIES WHERE
BREACii OCCuRS-On October 18, 1926, defendant Crute purchased of Prince
Motor Co., a certain motor truck, title to remain in vendor until the con-
sideration was paid. The conditional sales contract was evidenced by two
promissory notes, one for $250 due 5 months after date, the other for
$682.50 payable in monthly installments of $45. Each note was executed
by Crute as principal, payable to Prince Motor Co., and each contained a
description of the truck and a provision that it was given "as a part of
contract for the automobile" which was "to remain the property of the
Prince Motor Co. until all notes given" shall have been paid in full; that
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on default of payment of said notes at maturity, or any of said payments,
all of them were to become due, the rights of the vendee under the con-
tract were to be forfeited, and the vendor could resume possession of said
automobile without liability to refund any money previously paid on
account of the contract. The notes were assigned to plaintiff for valuable
consideration, and later, defendant having defaulted as to monthly pay-
ments, plaintiff repossessed the truck and commenced this action to en-
force the collection of the $250 note. Trial resulted in a finding and
judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Held: Judgment reversed.
Crute et al. v. La Porte Discount Corporation (No. 13507), App. Ct. Ind.,
August 1, 1929, 167 N. E. 542.
A vendor of property conditionally sold, reserving title to himself until
the purchase price is paid, may in case of default by the vendee either sue
to recover the specific property, or affirm the sale and sue for the price;
but he cannot do both, as the remedies are inconsistent. Quality Clothes
Shop v. Keeney, 57 Ind. App. 500, 106 N. E. 41;'Reeves v. Miller, 91 N. E.
812; Randall v. Chaney, 84 Ind. App. 280, 151 N. E. 105; Peoples State
Bank of Indianapolis v. Hall, 83 Ind. App. 385, 148 N. E. 486; Turk v.
Carnahan et al., 25 Ind. App. 125, 57 N. E. 729; Green v. Sinker, Davis &
Co., 135 Ind. 434, 35 N. E. 262; and having disaffirmed and taken possession
of the property, the consideration for the note is destroyed and his right
to recover on the note is lost, with one exception noted below.* Randall v.
Chaney, supra. The courts are in conflict as to what constitutes an elec-
tion between the two remedies, some holding that it is not the judgment
which may be obtained, but the commencement of, a suit to enforce a co-
existing, inconsistent remedy in a court having jurisdiction which consti-
tutes the decisive act and makes the election binding; Eilers Music House
v. Douglas, 90 Wash. 683, 156 P. 937, L. R. A. 1916F 613; Frisch v. Wells,
200 Mass. 429, 86 N. E. 775, 23 L. R. A. (NS) 144; Orcutt v. Rickenbrodt,
59 N. Y. S. 1008; (but see Ratchford v. Cayuga County Cold Storage &
Warehouse Co., 217 N. Y. 565, 112 N. E. 447); Truax v. Parvis, 7 Houst
(Del.), 32 Atl. 227; Merchants and P. Bank v. Thomas, 69 Tex. 237, 6 S. W.
565; Boas v. Knewing (Cal.), 165 P. 690, L. R. A. 1917F, 462; Osborne &
Co. v. Walther, 12 Okla. 20, 69 P. 953; while other courts hold that where
the seller brings suit and obtains judgment he has not lost the right to
retake the property where the judgment remains unpaid; Thomason v.
Lewis, 103 Ala. 426, 15 So. 830; Vaughn v. Hopson, 10 Bush 337; McPher-
son v. Acme Lumber Co., 70 Miss. 649, 12 So. 857; Campbell Printing Press
and Mfg. Co. v. Rockaway Pub. Co., 56 N. J. L. 676, 29 Atl. 681; Root v.
Lord, 23 Vt. 568; Moon v. Wright, 12 Ga. App. 659, 78 S. E. 141; or where
the suit is discontinued before judgment. Matthews v. Lucia, 55 Vt. 308.
The authority seems about equally divided, and there is apparently no case
directly in point in Indiana. In some jurisdictions, on default of the buyer,
part payments are regarded as forfeited, and it is not therefore necessary
to return the payments received or notes given for the price as a condition
precedent to a recovery of the goods. Fields v. Williams, 91 Ala. 502, 8 So.
808; Hughes v. Keely, 40 Conn. 148; Latham v.-Sumner, 89 Ill. 233, 31 Am.
Rep. 79; Fleck v. Warner, 25 Kans. 492; White v. Oakes, 88 Me. 367, 34
Atl. 175; Lorain Steel Co. v. Norfolk etc. Ry. Co., 187 Mass. 500, 73 N. E.
646; Tufts v. D'Arcambal, 85 Mich. 185, 48 N. W. 497; Duke v. Shackel-
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for-d, 56 Miss. 552; Humeston v. Cherry, 23 Hun 141; Morgan v. Kidder,
55 Vt. 367. In other jurisdictions, however, the rule has been adopted that
a return of the payments made or notes given is a condition precedent to a
recovery of the property. American Soda Fountain Co. v. Dean Drug Co.,
136 Iowa 312, 111 N. W. 534; Ketchum v. Brennan, 53 Miss. 596; Shafer
v,. Rassell, 28 Utah 444, 79 P. 559; Segrist v. Crabtree, 131 U. S. 287. Of
course, the right to retain the amounts paid may depend upon express stip-
ulation; Singer Mfg. Co. v. Treadway, 4 Ill. App. 57; and on the other hand
the contract may preclude a forfeiture of payment by stipulating that the
vendor may recover the property and reasonable charges. Fairbanks v.
Malloy, 16 Ill. App. 277. So too, it has been held that the seller may retain
such amount as will compensate him for any deterioration of the goods in
the hands of the buyer. Commercial Pub. Co. v. Campbell Printing Press,
etc. Co., 111 Ga. 388, 36 S. E. 756. The settled rule in Indiana is, that in
the absence of a forfeiture clause either express or implied, by virtue of
which all prior payments are to be retained by the vendor as liquidated
damages, upon retaking the property, he must account to the vendee for the
payments made to him. Quality Clothes Shop v. Keeney, supra. Where a
note is not included within the conditional terms of a contract of sale, but is
given as the equivalent of cash for a preliminary payment, its consideration
does not iail by reason of the recaption of the property by the vendor upon
the vendee's default, and the vendor may still enforce it. Norman v.
Meeker, 91 Wash. 534, 158 Pac. 78, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 462; Randall v.
Chaney, supra. Here, however, the conditional provisions of the sale con-
tract were inserted in the note, and no mistake is alleged or reformation
sought. The note in suit being part of the original conditional agreement,
and the consideration having failed therefor, the general rule prevails, and
it follows that the vendor cannot recover on the note. K. J. M.
CRIMINAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-CONSENT-Officers sent to search
D.'s home for intoxicating liquor read search warrant to D.'s wife, who
said "COME RIGHT IN. You are welcome to search here. You will not
find anything." Search warrant invalid. HELD: Such language did not
constitute an invitation to search, nor a waiver of D.'s constitutional right
against unlawful search and seizure. State v. Connor, 167 N. E. 545. Case
is in accord with Meno v. State, 197 Ind. 16, in holding that one acquiescing
to search under a warrant is merely yielding to legal coercion, resistance to
which is an offense against the state, and does not thereby consent to the
search. Accord: State v. Owens, 259 S. W. 100 (Ky.) ; State v. Lock, 259
S. W. 116 (Mo.); Hahpden v. State, 252 S. W 1007 (Tenn).
Failure to object to officers' search held not consent in U. S. v. Olmstead,
7 Fed. (2nd) 760, and yielding to a show of force is not consent, Amos v.
U. S., 255 U. S. 313; but see Gallendon v. U. S., 5 Fed. (2nd) 673, assent
under a threat to procure a search warrant held good consent. Owner of
property, in reply to a show of a search warrant said "All right. Go ahead.
You won't find anything." Held to constitute waiver as a matter of law.
State v,. Uotila, 71 Mont. 351. Accord, Gray v. Commonwealth, 749 S. W.
769; Smith v. McDuffee, 72 Ore. 286; State v. Luna, 266 S. W. 755 (Mo.).
Perhaps the best rule is, where there is a conflict of facts as to alleged
waiver, to submit the question to the jury under proper instructions. Peo-
ple v. Forman, 188 N. W. 375 (Mich.).
